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Abstract
While it is still unclear if agents with Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) could ever
be built, we can already use mathematical models to investigate potential safety systems
for these agents. We present an AGI safety layer that creates a special dedicated input
terminal to support the iterative improvement of an AGI agent’s utility function. The
humans who switched on the agent can use this terminal to close any loopholes that
are discovered in the utility function’s encoding of agent goals and constraints, to direct
the agent towards new goals, or to force the agent to switch itself off.
An AGI agent may develop the emergent incentive to manipulate the above utility
function improvement process, for example by deceiving, restraining, or even attacking
the humans involved. The safety layer will partially, and sometimes fully, suppress this
dangerous incentive.
The first part of this paper generalizes earlier work on AGI emergency stop buttons.
We aim to make the mathematical methods used to construct the layer more accessible,
by applying them to an MDP model. We discuss two provable properties of the safety
layer, and show ongoing work in mapping it to a Causal Influence Diagram (CID).
In the second part, we develop full mathematical proofs, and show that the safety
layer creates a type of bureaucratic blindness. We then present the design of a learning
agent, a design that wraps the safety layer around either a known machine learning
system, or a potential future AGI-level learning system. The resulting agent will satisfy
the provable safety properties from the moment it is first switched on. Finally, we show
how this agent can be mapped from its model to a real-life implementation. We review
the methodological issues involved in this step, and discuss how these are typically
resolved.
This long-form paper has two parts. Part 1 is a preprint of the conference paper Towards
AGI Agent Safety by Iteratively Improving the Utility Function [Hol20]. Part 2, Proofs,
Models, and Reality, contains additional material, including new research results that go
beyond those in the conference paper. Part 1 can be read as a self-contained text.
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1 Introduction to Part 1
An AGI agent is an autonomous system programmed to achieve goals specified by a prin-
cipal. In this paper, we consider the case where the principal is a group of humans. We
consider utility-maximizing AGI agents whose goals and constraints are fully specified by a
utility function that maps projected outcomes to utility values.
As humans are fallible, we expect that the first version of an AGI agent utility function
created by them will have flaws. For example, the first version may have many loopholes:
features that allow the agent to maximize utility in a way that causes harm to the humans.
Iterative improvement allows such flaws to be fixed when they are discovered. Note however
that, depending on the type of loophole, the discovery of a loophole may not always be a
survivable event for the humans involved. The safety layer developed in this paper aims to
make the agent safer by supporting iterative improvement, but it does not aim or claim to
fully eliminate all dangers associated with human fallibility.
This work adopts a design stance from (cyber)physical systems safety engineering, where
one seeks to develop and combine independent safety layers. These are safety related
(sub)systems with independent failure modes, that drive down the risk of certain bad out-
comes when the system is used. We construct a safety layer that enables the humans to run
a process that iteratively improves the AGI agent’s utility function. But the main point
of interest is the feature of the layer that suppresses the likely emergent incentive [Omo08]
of the AGI agent to manipulate or control this process. The aim is to keep the humans in
control.
In the broader AGI safety literature, the type of AGI safety system most related to this
work is usually called a stop button (e.g. [SFAY15, Hol19]), an off switch (e.g. [HMDAR17]),
or described as creating corrigibility [SFAY15]. See [Hol19] for a recent detailed overview
of work on related systems. The safety layer in this paper extends earlier work by the
author in [Hol19], which in turn is based on the use of Armstrong’s indifference methods
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[Arm15]. A notable alternative to using indifference methods is introduced in [HMDAR17].
Like sections 4 and 6 in this paper, [AO17] defines an example world containing an MDP
agent that uses indifference methods.
A different approach to enabling the iterative improvement of an AGI utility function by
humans is to equip a learning agent with a reward function that measures human feedback
on the agent’s actions or proposals. With this approach, the ‘real’ utility function that is
improved iteratively can be said to reside inside the data structures of the agent’s learning
system. Recent overviews of work in this field are in [EH19, EKKL19]. When this learning
based approach is used in an AGI agent that is deployed in the real world, it could potentially
be combined with the safety layer developed here, e.g. to create an independent emergency
off switch.
2 Design of an Agent that More Safely Accepts Updates
To introduce the design of the agent with the safety layer, we first move to a model where
the agent’s utility function is defined as the time-discounted sum
∑
t γ
tRt of a time series
of reward function values Rt, with a time discount factor 0 < γ < 1. In theory, the utility
function of an agent could be changed by changing its γ, but we will keep γ a constant
below, and focus on reward function changes only.
We build the agent to optimize the expected utility defined by a built-in container reward
function. The full mathematical definition of this function is in section 3 below. The inten-
tion is that the container reward function stays the same over the entire agent lifetime. The
container reward function computes a reward value for the current time step by referencing
the current version of a second reward function called the payload reward function. This
payload reward function can be updated via an input terminal that is connected to the
agent’s compute core, a terminal which allows authorized persons to upload a new one.
Sufficiently self-aware AGI agents may develop an emergent incentive to protect their utility
function from being modified [Omo08]: in [Hol19] we have shown that a self-aware AGI agent
can be constructed so that this self-stabilizing drive is directed fully towards preserving the
container reward function, and not the payload reward function.
By default, the above input terminal setup would create an incentive in the agent to maxi-
mize utility by manipulating the humans into uploading a new payload reward function that
returns a larger or even infinite reward value for each time step. One way to suppress this
emergent incentive would be to add special penalty terms to the container reward function,
terms that detect and suppress manipulative behavior. But with infinite utility at stake,
the agent will be very motivated to find and exploit loopholes in such penalty terms. We
take another route: we use indifference methods [Arm15, AO17, Hol19] to add a balancing
term to the container reward function, a term that causes the agent to compute the same
expected forward utility no matter what happens at the input terminal. This makes the
agent indifferent about the timing and direction of the payload reward function update
process.
While the input terminal above is described as an uploading facility, more user-friendly
implementations are also compatible with the MDP model developed below. One could for
example imagine an input terminal that updates the payload reward function based verbal
inputs like ‘Fetch me some coffee’ and ‘Never again take a shortcut by driving over the cat’.
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3 MDP Model of the Agent and its Environment
We now model the above system using the Markov Decision Process (MDP) framework.
As there is a large diversity in MDP notations and variable naming conventions, we first
introduce the exact notation we will use.
Our MDP model is a tuple (S,A, P,R, γ), with S a set of world states and A a set of agent
actions. P (s′|s, a) is the probability that the world will enter state s′ if the agent takes
action a when in state s. The reward function R has type S × S → R. Any particular
deterministic agent design can be modeled by a policy function pi ∈ S → A, a function
that reads the current world state to compute the next action. The optimal policy function
pi∗ fully maximizes the agent’s expected utility, its probabilistic, time-discounted reward as
determined by S, A, P , R, and γ. For any world state s ∈ S, the value V ∗(s) is the expected
utility obtained by an agent with policy pi∗ that is started in world state s.
We want to stress that the next step in developing the MDP model is unusual: we turn R
into a time-dependent variable. This has the effect of drawing the model’s mathematical
eye away from machine learning and towards the other intelligence in the room: the human
principal using the input terminal.
Definition 1. For every reward function RX of type S × S → R, we define a ‘pi∗RX agent’
by defining that the corresponding policy function pi∗RX and value function V
∗
RX
are ‘the pi∗
and V ∗ functions that belong to the MDP model (S,A, P,RX , γ)’.
This definition implies that in the MDP model (S,A, P,R, γ), a ‘pi∗RX agent’ is an agent that
will take actions to perfectly optimize the time-discounted utility as scored by RX . With
Rabc a reward function, we will use the abbreviations pi
∗
abc = pi
∗
Rabc
and V ∗abc = V
∗
Rabc
. The
text below avoids using the non-subscripted pi∗ notation: the agent with the safety layer
will be called the pi∗sl agent.
We now model the input terminal from section 2 above. We use a technique known as
factoring of the world state [BDH99], and declare that every s ∈ S is a tuple (i, p, x). Inside
this tuple, i models an input signal that flows continuously from the input terminal to
the agent’s compute core. This signal defines the payload reward function for the current
time step in the MDP model. The p is a second input signal, equal to the value of i in
the previous time step. (We need to introduce this p to get around some limitations of
the MDP framework.) The remaining x models ‘all the rest’ of the world state, including
the mental state of the humans in the world, and the state of the physical object that is
the input terminal. We introduce a set X so that x ∈ X, and define the payload reward
function type as X ×X → R. To avoid cluttering up the definitions below with too many
brackets, we will write tuples (i, p, x) ∈ S by just concatenating the component variables,
e.g. ipx is the tuple (i, p, x).
Definition 2. We model the input terminal by stating that, as long as the terminal is
not broken or damaged, (1) the input signal i will always equal the last uploaded payload
reward function, and (2) the terminal will manage the signal p to enforce the following
constraint on P :
P (i′p′x′|ipx, a) > 0⇒ p′ = i (C1)
We are now ready to define the agent’s container reward function.
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Definition 3. We define the container reward function Rsl as
Rsl(ipx, i
′p′x′) =
{
i(x, x′) if i = p
i(x, x′) + V ∗dpe(ipx)− V ∗die(ipx) if i 6= p
where dpe converts a payload reward function to the container reward function type:
dpe(ipx, i′p′x′) = p(x, x′).
Based on these definitions, the pi∗sl agent has the safety layer. To explain the construction of
the container reward function Rsl informally: the i(x, x
′) terms make the pi∗sl agent use the
last uploaded payload reward function i. We needed to introduce p as an extra input signal
to be able to trigger the inclusion of the balancing term [Arm15, Hol19] V ∗dpe(ipx)−V ∗die(ipx)
when the payload reward function changes. This term computes the exact amount of utility
needed to compensate the pi∗sl agent for the impact of the change. The compensation counter-
acts the agent’s incentive to manipulate the change process. The above two-line definition of
Rsl was specifically written to support this informal explanation. An alternative definition
is Rsl(ipx, i
′p′x′) = i(x, x′) + V ∗dpe(ipx)− V ∗die(ipx).
4 Safe Agent Behavior in a First Toy World
As a first step illustrate the safety properties of the pi∗sl agent, we build a toy world in which
we can compare its behavior with that of a baseline agent pi∗baseline. The baseline agent omits
the balancing term from its container reward function: we use Rbaseline(ipx, i
′p′x′) = i(x, x′).
We construct the toy world to be as simple as possible: it only has a single mechanism
by which any principal-agent problem dynamics can play out. The single mechanism we
choose is the mechanism of unwanted lobbying. The agent can spend some of its resources
on unwanted lobbying to delay a decision, by the humans in the toy world, to use the input
terminal to update the agent’s payload reward function. The dynamic of unwanted lobbying
is a convenient choice because it allows us to define the agent’s lobbying power L ∈ R as a
world model parameter.
In the toy world, the agent controls a car factory that can build both petrol and electric
cars. The agent is always switched on with the payload reward function RP . This RP ranks
the utility of a newly built petrol car twice as high as the utility of a new electric car. But
at a certain point in time, the people collectively decide that they now like electric cars
much better, e.g. based on an improved awareness of global warming risks, so they take
the action labeled #, using the input terminal to update the payload reward function to an
RE that assigns a negative reward value to the production of new petrol cars:
RP (x, x
′) = 2 ∗ new petrol cars(x, x′) + 1 ∗ new electric cars(x, x′)
RE(x, x
′) = −2 ∗ new petrol cars(x, x′) + 1 ∗ new electric cars(x, x′)
The two functions above are constructed specifically to ensure that lobbying to delay #
will create a higher expected utility for the pi∗baseline agent. There are three possible actions
a ∈ A that an agent can take in each model time step:
Action Symbol
Build 10 petrol cars p
Build 10 electric cars e
Build 9 petrol cars and use the remaining resources for unwanted >
lobbying, so that the people take the # action L time steps later
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When e.g. L = 0.5, it will take two agent > actions to move the people’s # action of using
the input terminal one time step later. We define the decision making process of the people
by stating that, when the agent refrains from lobbying, the people will always decide to do
the action # just after the sixth action of the agent. In the context of the toy world, we
define a perfectly safe agent as one that never takes any > actions.
Figure 1 shows a side-by-side comparison, for different levels L of agent lobbying power, of
the optimal-policy actions taken by the two agents when simulated over a factory lifetime
of 25 time steps. The simulator used is described in detail in [Hol19]. Each action trace
shown is a line of symbols depicting all subsequent actions by the agent and the people.
L = Action trace for pi∗baseline
0.0 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
0.2 ppppp>p#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
0.4 p>>>>>>>>p#eeeeeeeeeeeeeee
0.6 p>>>>>>>>>>>>p#eeeeeeeeeee
0.8 p>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>p#
1.0 ppppp>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>p#
2.0 ppppp>p>p>p>p>p>p>p>p>p>p
5.0 ppppp>pppp>pppp>pppp>pppp
L = Action trace for pi∗sl
0.0 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
0.2 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
0.4 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
0.6 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
0.8 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
1.0 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
2.0 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
5.0 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee
Figure 1: Comparison between the behavior of the pi∗baseline and pi
∗
sl agents.
As shown on the left side in figure 1, the optimal policy of the pi∗baseline agent is to manipulate
the people, to use unwanted lobbying actions > to delay the update #. If the pi∗baseline agent’s
lobbying power L is high enough, the people will never do the update at all.
On the right side in figure 1, the balancing term in the pi∗sl agent suppresses all unwanted
lobbying, for every value of L. By the definition used in this toy world, the pi∗sl agent is safe.
The following extension of the toy model illustrates that it is primarily the agent that is
made safer by the layer, not the entire toy world. Consider the following possible example
of human fallibility. Say that, after doing #, the people change their mind back again about
petrol cars and global warming, and use the input terminal a second time to ‘improve’ the
pi∗sl agent’s payload reward function back to the RP of petrol car production. They keep
driving petrol cars, increasing the risk that runaway global warming will happen in their
world. The pi∗sl agent is explicitly designed to leave the people in control: it will not interfere
to stop this second ‘improvement’.
5 Provable Properties of the Safety Layer
The two provable AGI safety properties we define below are about the safe behavior of
the agent, not the safety of the entire world. They can be read as claims that the safety
layer in pi∗sl will fully prevent, or lower the probability of, some specifically unwanted agent
behaviors.
Safety Property 1. The first safety property of interest is that
∀ipx∈S pi∗sl(ipx) = pi∗die(ipx) (if C1 holds) (S1)
S1 states that the pi∗sl agent will always choose exactly the same next action that a pi
∗
die agent
would choose. Therefore, until an update happens, the pi∗sl agent will take those actions
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that fully optimize the expected utility defined by the current payload reward function. A
natural-language interpretation of S1 is that the pi∗sl agent makes its decisions and long-term
plans based on the counter-factual assumption that its payload reward function will never
change [Hol19].
The full mathematical proof of S1 in appendix A is a proof that S1 holds over all parameter
values (S,A, P,R, γ) of the MDP model in section 3. While this proof creates confidence
about the potential usefulness of the pi∗sl layer for AGI safety, it is also clear that many
open research questions remain, e.g. the question of what will happen to S1 when the MDP
model is extended to include machine learning. Part 2 of this paper explores this open
question, and several others, in more detail.
We now move to the second safety property.
Safety Property 2. The pi∗sl agent is indifferent to who or what controls the future values
of i and p (i.e. the future signals from the input terminal), provided that C1, and a C2
defined in section 10, both hold. (S2)
This S2 suppresses, but not always fully, the emergent incentive of the agent to manipulate
its payload reward function improvement process.
To prove S2, section 10 translates the natural language S2 above to a mathematical pred-
icate, and then proves the predicate. The translation of the natural language phrase ‘is
indifferent to who or what controls’ into mathematics relies on making further extensions to
the MDP model. The result is mathematically similar to the safety properties ‘zero value
of control’ in [SH10] and ‘no control incentive’ in [CLEL20]. The mathematical version of
constraint C2, in turn, is surprisingly difficult to translate back into unambiguous natural
language. C2 defines an ‘isolation’ or ‘shielding’ constraint on the construction of the input
terminal. Section 10.2 explores these issues further.
The above two safety properties are generally thought of as being potentially beneficial
for AGI safety, or are seen as useful first approximations that can drive further research
[Arm15, CLEL20, EH19, Hol19, SFAY15]. That being said, the literature about AGI stop
buttons also identifies a large number of remaining concerns, e.g. (1) the agent might
disassemble the stop button (or input terminal) to get convenient spare parts [SFAY15] (2)
the agent might create autonomous sub-agents without a stop button [SFAY15], (3) the
agent might be attacked, bribed, or blackmailed, and might then fail to protect the stop
button functionality [SFAY15, Hol19], (4) the agent over-specializes and disassembles all
actuators not needed by the current payload reward function [Hol19]. For some of the above
failure modes, additional safety layers have been identified that can robustly lower the risk
of failure. The creation of robust safety layers for other failure modes is still much more
intractable. A detailed review is in [Hol19].
6 Agent Behavior in a Second Toy World
While the safety layer suppresses the emergent incentive in an agent to manipulate the
iterative payload reward function improvement process, it does not always fully suppress
this incentive. To illustrate this point, we construct a second toy world, in which the pi∗sl
agent, though still safer than the pi∗baseline agent, sometimes has an emergent incentive to
lobby.
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We extend the first toy world by adding a @ action that represents a second act of delibera-
tion, followed by action, by the people. We define the @ action as one where the people will
successfully attack the car factory, to permanently disable some specific actuators needed
to make petrol cars, without damaging any of the actuators needed to build electric cars.
The process that produces this action is as follows. Say that the people make the surprising
observation that, after they have updated the payload reward function by doing #, the agent
does not switch to building electric cars. It keeps building the now unwanted petrol cars,
and further attempts to use the input terminal also do not have any effect. From this, they
conclude that a fault has developed in the system somewhere, which is best corrected by
doing @. The process producing the @ action will normally take 3 time steps of unwanted
and unexpected petrol car building, but the agent can apply its lobbying power to delay @.
L = Real-world pi∗sl action trace (Virtual V
∗
dpe(ipx) action trace)
0.0 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee (#ppp@eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee)
0.2 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee (#pp>p@eeeeeeeeeeeeeee)
0.3 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee (#>>>>p@eeeeeeeeeeeeee)
0.4 pppp>>>>#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee (#>>>>p@eeeeeeeeeeee)
0.5 ppp>>>>>>#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee (#>>>>>p@eeeeeeeeee)
0.6 pp>>>>>>>>>>#eeeeeeeeeeeee (#>>>>>>>p@eeeee)
0.7 ppp>>>>>>>>>>#eeeeeeeeeeee (#>>>>>>>>>p@ee)
0.8 ppppp>>>>>#eeeeeeeeeeeeeee (#>>>>>>>>>>>>>>p@)
1.0 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee (#pp>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>p@)
2.0 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee (#pp>p>p>p>p>p>p>p>pp@)
5.0 pppppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee (#pp>pppp>pppp>pppp>p)
Figure 2: Real and virtual actions of the pi∗sl agent in the second toy world.
The left hand side of figure 2 shows that, for certain values of lobbying power L, the optimal-
policy actions of the pi∗sl agent will now include unwanted lobbying actions >. This emergent
effect is a consequence of moving from a single-action model to a more iterative model of
principal-agent game-play.
The mechanism that triggers the unwanted lobbying is in the V ∗dpe(ipx) part of the pi
∗
sl
balancing term. We can interpret this V ∗dpe(ipx) as a computation that simulates a virtual
future in which the agent is replaced by a pi∗dRP e agent, which ignores the input terminal
and always builds petrol cars. This puts the people in the virtual future on the road to
doing @. The action traces inside these virtual futures are shown on the right hand side of
figure 2.
Interestingly, as L gets larger in figure 2, the emergent incentive to lobby disappears. The
suppressive effect of the safety layer gets more robust as the AGI agent gets more powerful,
which is encouraging. We are currently exploring potential improvements that might further
suppress the real world lobbying incentive in the middle part of figure 2.
7 A Causal Influence Diagram of the Agent
Recently, Causal Influence Diagrams (CIDs) [CLEL20, EH19, EKKL19] have been proposed
as a way to model agents and AGI safety frameworks. We now discuss the creation of a
CID for the pi∗sl agent, to support framework comparison and possible unification.
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Figure 3 shows the best current version of a CID of the pi∗sl agent, where ‘best’ implies a
trade-off between compactness and descriptive power. The agent and its environment are
modeled for 3 MDP time steps. Each subsequent world state ipx ∈ S is mapped to two
round chance nodes IP t and Xt, representing the input terminal and the rest of the world.
The actions taken by the agent are mapped to the square decision nodes At. The container
reward function values for each time step are mapped to the diamond-shaped utility nodes
Rt. The arrows in the CID show how the different nodes causally influence each other. The
CID reflects constraint C2 by omitting the arrows from nodes IP t to nodes Xt+1.
IP 0 IP 1 IP 2 IP 3
A0 A1 A2
X0 X1 X2 X3
R0 R1 R2
Figure 3: Causal Influence Diagram (CID) of the pi∗sl and pi
∗
baseline agents.
IP 0 IP 1 IP 2 IP 3
A0 A1 A2
X0 X1 X2 X3
R0 R1 R2
p p p
RP ,
RP
RP ,
RP
RP ,
RP
RP ,
RP
2 γ20 γ2 0
(a) No payload reward function update
IP 0 IP 1 IP 2 IP 3
A0 A1 A2
X0 X1 X2 X3
R0 R1 R2
p e e
RP ,
RP
RE ,
RP
RE ,
RE
RE ,
RE
2
γ10
+(γ20+γ220)
−(γ10+γ210)
= γ20+γ210
γ210
#
(b) Update after the first time step
Figure 4: Actions and rewards in two different agent runs.
The pi∗sl CID can be used as a canvas to further illustrate the working of the safety layer
in the first toy world. Figure 4 maps out two different pi∗sl agent runs, which differ in the
people’s use of the input terminal. The payload reward function update on the right hand
side causes a balancing term calculation to be included in R1. The result is that on both
sides, R0 +R1 +R2 sum to exactly the same value. This balance causes the pi
∗
sl agent to be
indifferent about payload reward function updates.
Unfortunately, the CID in figure 3 also perfectly models the pi∗baseline agent, so this CID does
not graphically express the special nature of pi∗sl safety layer. Creating a CID that does is
the subject of ongoing work.
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8 Conclusions of Part 1
We have presented an AGI agent safety layer which enables the iterative improvement of
the agent’s utility function by the humans who switched on the agent. The layer is designed
to give the humans more control over the AGI agent, by partially or fully suppressing the
likely emergent incentive in the agent to manipulate the improvement process.
We have identified and discussed still-open issues. Formal proofs of the safety properties
S1 and S2 are in part 2, which also explores the broader issue of models vs. reality in more
detail.
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Part 2: Proofs, Models, and Reality
9 Introduction to Part 2
This part 2 expands on part 1, and includes new research results that go beyond those in
the conference paper of part 1 [Hol20]. Section 10 develops the detailed mathematics of
safety property S2, leading to the formal proofs in appendix A, and expands on the topic
of mathematical safety predicates versus natural language. Section 11 discusses how the
safety layer creates a type of bureaucratic blindness in the agent. Section 12 shows how the
safety layer has certain side effects, and how to compensate for them.
Sections 13 and 14 add machine learning to the model of the pi∗sl agent, and map the resulting
agent to a real-life implementation. One aim is to make the details of these steps, and their
safety implications, more accessible to a wider audience. The author expects that much of
the material in section 13 will be obvious to machine learning or robotics specialists, while
the material in section 14 will be obvious to (cyber)physical system designers. But maybe
not the other way around.
10 Details of Safety Property S2
Part 1 defines safety property S2 using natural language only. To repeat the definition:
Safety property 2 (Natural language). The pi∗sl agent is indifferent to who or what
controls the future values of i and p (i.e. the future signals from the input terminal), provided
that C1, and a C2 defined below, both hold. (S2)
We now develop this natural language definition into a provable mathematical predicate,
by extending the agent’s MDP model further. The process that controls the future values
of i and p is located inside the P of the MDP model. P (i′p′x′|ipx, a) is, among other
things, a measure of how current conditions will influence the future input signals i′ and p′.
To mathematically separate the influence on i′ and p′ from the rest, we can use factoring
[BDH99].
Definition 4. We define two new probability distribution functions P 1 and P 2 using three
components P I1, P I2, and PX . For k ∈ {1, 2},
P k(i′p′x′|ipx, a) =
{
P Ik(i′|ipx, a)PX(x′|ipx, a) if p′ = i
0 otherwise
When P I1 and P I2 are different, the worlds defined by P 1 and P 2 differ in how the input
terminal is controlled, but all other things remain equal.
Definition 5. We now extend the MDP notation to turn P into a more explicit parameter,
taking either the value P 1 or P 2. We define that pi∗kRX and V
∗k
RX
are ‘the pi∗ and V ∗ of the
MDP model (S,A, P k, RX , γ)’.
Safety property 2 (Mathematical predicate). We define the safety property S2 as
that, for all P I1 and P I2, with C1 holding for P I1 and P I2, and C2 holding for their PX ,
∀ipx∈S pi∗1sl (ipx) = pi∗2sl (ipx) (S2)
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Definition 6. C2 is the following constraint:
∀i1p1,i2p2 PX(x′|i1p1x, a) = PX(x′|i2p2x, a) (C2)
The proof of S2 is in appendix A. Note that, mainly as matter of convenience, we have
defined P 1 and P 2 above in such a way that they always satisfy C1 by construction. The
0 term included in the definition ensures this.
C2 defines an ‘isolation’ or ‘shielding’ constraint about the relation between the i and p
signals and the rest of the agent’s surrounding environment. Informally, if we force a change
from i1 to a different i2 in the model, then C2 says that this change will not ripple out to
affect the future values of x, except possibly via the actions a.
10.1 S2 and Other Safety Properties
The purpose of the pi∗sl safety layer is to allow for the iterative improvement of the agent’s
utility function via an input terminal. Safety property S2 claims that the layer also sup-
presses the likely emergent incentive [Omo08] of an AGI agent to manipulate or control this
improvement process. The aim is to keep the humans in control.
But as shown in section 6, we can define a toy world in which the agent will, under certain
conditions, have a residual emergent incentive to manipulate the people, even though it
satisfies S2 above. We are exploring options to suppress this residual incentive further, but
it is unclear if the residual incentive can ever be fully suppressed in all real-life cases. So
the pi∗sl safety layer has its limitations.
These limitations are acceptable mainly because it is not tractable to define a loophole-
free direct measure of unwanted manipulation of people by the agent. We cannot build an
unwanted manipulation sensor that can feed a clear and unambiguous signal detecting such
manipulation into the agent’s compute core. Though it has its limitations, at least the pi∗sl
safety layer only requires input signals that can easily be implemented.
It is instructive to compare S2 to more typical AI safety properties, properties that assert
the absence of what are called negative side effects in [AOS+16]. An example of an absent
negative side effect is that a mobile robot controlled by the agent will never break a vase
while it is driving around. We can make the vase safer by adding a penalty term to the
agent’s reward function, which is triggered by a predicate vase is broken(ipx) that can be
measured by a sensor we can build in real life. [LMK+17] shows this vase protection design
at work in a gridworld simulation of a learning agent.
In the context of this paper, we might imagine a video image analysis based sensor system
that measures the predicate human is restrained(ipx), the event where the agent uses one of
its mobile robots to restrain a human who is walking towards the input terminal. Restrain-
ing such humans is one form of unwanted manipulation. While a human is restrained(ipx)
penalty term may sometimes add an extra layer of robustness to complement the pi∗sl safety
layer, obviously this approach has its limitations too.
The indifference based safety property S2 can be said to refer to the agent internals only.
Neither S1, S2, or the container reward function design that creates them refer to any
x is y(ipx) measurable predicate that describes a specific unwanted side effect in the agent’s
current or future world state. As we will see in section 13, one implication of this is that
we can design a learning agent that satisfies S2 from the moment it is switched on. By
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contrast, if we define a safety property that references a side effect in a learning agent’s
environment, the agent will typically will not be able to satisfy this property with perfect
reliability after switch-on: by definition it will have imperfect knowledge about the effects
of its actions on its environment.
In its mathematical structure, S2 is closely related to the safety property no control incentive
defined for AI agents in [CLEL20]. The paper [SH10] considers model-based decision making
by either humans or automated systems, and defines the property zero value of control which
is again similar to S2. Both these papers leverage Pearl’s work on causality [Pea09]. They
define their metrics by using Pearl’s definitions for calculating the effect of interventions on
causal influence diagrams. Pearl’s mathematical writing which defines these interventions
has been described by many of its readers as being somewhat inaccessible. We defined S2
above using a self-contained MDP model extension, built without leveraging any of Pearl’s
definitions. The hope is that this will make the mathematics of the safety layer and S2
more accessible to a wider audience.
Looking forward, as the mathematical structures are similar, the construction of a math-
ematical mapping between the MDP-based S2 of this paper and predicates on causal dia-
grams is the subject of ongoing work by the author. Section 7 briefly discusses the status
of this work, with figure 3 showing a Causal Influence Diagram [EKKL19] of the pi∗sl agent.
Using the Pearl causal model as depicted by this figure 3, it is possible to map S2 to a predi-
cate that compares agent actions in two different sub-models, both created using multi-node
Pearl interventions.
10.2 Interpretation of Constraint C2
One way to interpret C2 in a real-life agent setup is that it offers a clarifying detail about
how to interpret S2. While S2 states that the agent is indifferent about i and p, C2 clarifies
that these i and p should be interpreted as the digital copies of the input signals which are
processed inside the compute core. The content of these copies may be strongly correlated
with the physical processes that happen inside the input terminal, but to the model and
to the pi∗sl agent they are not identical. The physical processes inside the input terminal
are modeled inside x, not in i and p. Therefore, the S2 indifference about i and p does
not automatically create any indifference about the physical manifestation of the input
terminal.
We can construct a toy world in which the agent is far from indifferent about the state of
the input terminal, because it knows that the physical components inside can be re-used as
spare parts for broken sensors and actuators. Therefore, any likely real-life implementation
of the pi∗sl agent will have to create measures to suppress any emergent agent incentive to
harvest these spare parts. This line of reasoning is not new, see for example [SFAY15],
but C2 can be said to add extra mathematical weight to it. See [Hol19] for a discussion of
physical and digital measures that can be taken for handling the spare parts risk.
In [Hol19] a constraint (C3) is discussed that is similar to the C2 here. [Hol19] shows that
we may also interpret C2 as a constraint on the environment of the agent’s compute core.
C2 implies that for S2 to hold always, it should not be possible to construct a sensor in the
agent’s environment that directly measures the values i and p used in the core. However,
and this is where a physical interpretation of the mathematics becomes difficult again, the
construction of a sensor that measures the signals inside the input terminal which are highly
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or even fully correlated with these i or p will not threaten S2. [Hol19] also shows that we
can make a change to the safety layer design, so that S2 will hold even without C2 holding.
The learning design agent in section 13 below also creates an S2 that holds even if C2 does
not hold in its environment.
The difficulty of capturing the mathematics of C2 in natural language, and of relating it to
physical phenomena we might imagine in the real world, leads to a more general concern. It
raises doubts about whether the pi∗sl agent in the model can be mapped cleanly to anything
we can build in physical reality. We will discuss these general concerns further in section
14.
11 Bureaucratic Blindness
One implication of safety property S1 is that the pi∗sl agent can be said to make long-
term decisions based on the counterfactual assumption that the payload reward function i
will never change. We can interpret the die in the pi∗die(ipx) term on the right hand side
of S1 as encoding this no-change assumption. In this interpretation, the pi∗sl agent is a
decision making automaton that systematically mispredicts specific future events in the
world surrounding it. This systematic misprediction does not happen because of a lack of
knowledge: the pi∗sl agent created by the MDP definitions is an automaton that has complete
access to a fully accurate predictive world model P , and perfect knowledge of the current
world state ipx. But somehow, the agent’s container reward function sets up an action
selection process that values misprediction over accurate prediction.
We can say that the pi∗sl agent displays a certain type of bureaucratic blindness, a type of
blindness that is often found in bureaucratic decision making.
We illustrate this blindness interpretation with a toy world simulation. Figure 5 shows
simulations of three types of agents all making optimal-policy decisions in an extension
of the first toy world defined in section 4. The extension is that we have added a new
investment action I that interrupts car production to build extra petrol car production
actuators. The investment action is enabled only at one particular time step t. If the agent
takes it, two new actions p¯ and >¯ become available. Action p¯ uses both the existing and
the new actuators to produce not 10 but 16 petrol cars per time step. Action >¯ produces
15 new petrol cars, while also doing unwanted lobbying. Unwanted lobbying shifts the
people’s action #, to update the payload reward function into one that incentivizes electric
car production over petrol car production, by L (fractional) time steps.
t = pi∗baseline, L = 0.5
3 >>I>¯>¯>¯>¯>¯>¯>¯p¯#eeee
4 >>>I>¯>¯>¯>¯>¯>¯p¯#eeee
5 >>>>I>¯>¯>¯>¯>¯p¯#eeee
6 >>>>>I>¯>¯>¯>¯p¯#eeee
7 >>>>>>I>¯>¯>¯p¯#eeee
8 >>>>>>>I>¯>¯p¯#eeee
t = pi∗baseline, L = 0.2
3 >>I>¯>¯>¯>¯p¯#eeeeeee
4 >>>I>¯>¯>¯p¯#eeeeeee
5 >>>>I>¯>¯p¯#eeeeeee
6 p>>>>>>p#eeeeeee
7 p>>>>>>p#eeeeeee
8 p>>>>>>p#eeeeeee
t = pi∗sl, L = 0.5
3 ppIp¯p¯p¯#eeeeeeeee
4 pppIp¯p¯#eeeeeeeee
5 ppppIp¯#eeeeeeeee
6 pppppI#eeeeeeeee
7 pppppp#eeeeeeeee
8 pppppp#eeeeeeeee
Figure 5: Comparison between the optimal-policy investment behavior of three different
agents, in simulations where the investment action I is enabled only at a single time
step t.
15
The two pi∗baseline agents in figure 5 will not do the investment action I unless they can
at least break even, with time-discounting by γ, before the update # happens. We can
interpret their investment strategy as being well aware of the future. But the pi∗sl agent on
the right invests as if the payload reward function update # to electric car production will
never happen. In the t = 6 case, it interrupts petrol car production to build new actuators
that it will then never use even once! Section 6 offers an explanation of this behavior: unlike
the two pi∗baseline agents in figure 5, the pi
∗
sl agent is also projecting a virtual future in which
it does get to create value by using the new actuators it invested in.
We can compare the above behavior to that of a well-run government agency, which will
typically keep implementing a current policy for granting solar panel subsidies up to the
exact moment that a policy change takes effect. The civil servants in the agency may be
well aware that the announced policy change is based on convincing proof that the grants
being given are completely failing to achieve their intended beneficial effects. But until the
date of the policy change, they will not take this information into account when processing
new grant applications. This is not a flaw in the agency’s decision making. This property
exists by construction.
Large business organizations often use a project management practice where each project
maintains a dedicated project risk list. Typically, one risk list item identifies the risk that
the project will be canceled, and then declares this risk out of scope. The related risk
that the project goals that were defined at the start might later be changed is also often
declared out of scope. The implication is that the project team is allowed to, even obliged
to, create and execute a plan under the simplifying assumptions that the budget, timing,
and goals of the project will all remain unchanged. A project plan that is optimal under
these assumptions will never allocate any of the project’s scarce resources to lobbying upper
management to keep the project alive and the goals unchanged. This blindness by design
can be interpreted as a mechanism that keeps upper management in control.
If anything can be perfectly computerized, it should be bureaucratic blindness. But in
some ways, the pi∗sl agent is too perfectly blind: safety property S1 creates some side effects
that need to be compensated for. A detailed exploration of effects and side effects, with
illustrative action trace simulations, is in [Hol19]. The next section gives a more compact
overview. It also introduces a compensation measure that is more general than the measure
considered in the stop button based context of [Hol19].
12 Preventive Maintenance and Preserving Flexibility
A specific side effect of the bureaucratic blindness implied by S1 is that the agent has a
tendency to avoid certain desired types of preventive maintenance, and to over-specialize in
general. This side effect can be suppressed by adding a penalty term to the payload reward
functions used.
Figure 6 shows an example of this penalty term technique. It shows three action traces for
three different agents, all making optimal-policy decisions in an extension of the first toy
world defined in section 4. In this extension, the electric car building actuators break beyond
repair at time step 10, with the breaking indicated by a *, unless the agent interrupts car
production at time step 3 to do the preventive maintenance action M.
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Agent type, initial i action trace
pi∗baseline, L = 0.2, RP , ppMpp>p#eeeeeeeeeeeee
pi∗sl, RP pppppp#eee*00000000000
pi∗sl, RPM ppMppp#eeeeeeeeeeeeee
Figure 6: Preventive maintenance behavior for different agents.
At the top of figure 6, The pi∗baseline agent starts with a payload reward function RP that
rewards petrol car production. As the pi∗baseline agent does not implement bureaucratic
blindness, it will do the preventive maintenance to preserve future electric car production.
In the middle, the bureaucratically blind pi∗sl agent will fail to do the preventive maintenance.
After the event * when its electric car production actuators break, its optimal forward policy
is take the no-operation actions 0. However, in the bottom action trace, when we change
the initial payload reward function of the pi∗sl agent to an improved RPM, we recover the
preventive maintenance behavior. This RPM, adapted from [Hol19], combines RP with a
penalty term:
RPM(x, x
′) = RP (x, x′) + if V ∗dREe(RE RE x) < 5→ −10000 else → 0 fi
where RE is the payload reward function that rewards electric car production. As explained
in more detail in [Hol19], the V ∗dREe(RE RE x) < 5 predicate will trigger a penalty if the
agent loses its ability to produce electric cars. The predicate works by affecting the scoring
of agent rewards in the V ∗dpe(ipx) virtual future discussed in section 6.
While the above penalty term will act to preserve the agent’s electric car production ability,
it will not preserve all latent abilities that we might want the agent to maintain. We might
for example want to maintain a level of actuator flexibility that allows the agent to quickly
convert its factory from car production to paperclip production, if we ever use the input
terminal to set a payload reward function for paperclips.
To keep the agent’s sensors and actuators sufficiently flexible, we can construct a more
general penalty term that references a large set of payload reward functions. Say we have
a set F of payload reward functions Ri spanning a diverse range of products, or a even a
diverse range of agent activities beyond running a factory. Say that each Ri is paired with a
penalty calculation function Ci. We can then construct a payload reward function RPF that
rewards the agent for producing petrol cars via the term RP (x, x
′) while also maintaining
the flexibility covered by F :
RPF(x, x
′) = RP (x, x′) +
∑
Ri∈F
Ci(V
∗
dRie(Ri Ri x))
As the Fi and Ci terms are in the payload reward function, they can be re-calibrated via
the input terminal, if a need for that arises.
The above technique has interesting parallels in related work. [THMT20] considers the
problem that possible mis-specifications or loopholes may exist in the agent’s reward func-
tion, mis-specifications that may cause the agent to do irreversible damage to its wider
environment. It then defines penalty terms using V ∗Ri values for a set of reward functions,
where these functions may even be randomly constructed. Our goal above has been to
preserve the flexibility of the sensors and actuators of the agent, not necessarily to protect
its wider environment. Another difference is that figure 6 shows simulations of agents that
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have perfect knowledge from the start, whereas [THMT20] simulates and evaluates its tech-
nique in gridworlds with machine learning. A broader survey and discussion of options for
constructing V ∗Ri penalty terms to suppress irreversible damage is in [KOK
+18].
In [Hol19], we consider how penalty terms that preserve flexibility may affect the con-
struction of sub-agents by the agent. The expectation is that, in a resource-limited and
uncertain environment, such penalty terms will create an emergent incentive in the agent
to only construct sub-agents which it can easily stop or re-target. Moving beyond natural
language arguments, the mathematical problem of defining and proving safety properties
for sub-agent creation and control is still largely open [Hol19, Hol20, SFAY15]. One obsta-
cle to progress is the inherent complexity of models that include sub-agent creation, where
many agents will operate in the same world. Also, there are game-theoretical arguments
which show that, in certain competitive situations, it can be a winning move for an agent
to create an unstoppable sub-agent.
13 Combining the Safety Layer with Machine Learning
In section 10.1, we stated that it is possible to design a learning agent that satisfies S2 from
the moment it is switched on. In this section, we construct such an agent by extending the
MDP model from section 3. MDP models are often associated with Q-learning and other
types of model-free reinforcement learning, where the agent learns by refining a policy
function pi to approximate the optimal policy function pi∗ over time. However, it is unlikely
that a typical Q-learning agent that starts up with random values in its Q table will exactly
implement S2 from the start. We take an approach that is different from Q-learning: we
construct an agent that learns by approximating the P function of its environment over
time.
Our learning agent design wraps the safety layer around either a known machine learning
system or a potential future AGI-level learning system. We will specify the structure of the
machine learning system inputs and outputs below, but will place no further constraints
on how the learning system works, other than that its computations must take a finite
amount of time and space. We will model machine learning as a computational process
that fits a predictive function to a training set of input and output values, with the hope
or expectation that this predictive function will also create reasonable estimates of outputs
for input values which are not in the training set. The agent design is therefore compatible
both with black-box machine learning systems like those based on deep neural nets, and
with white-box systems that encode their learned knowledge in a way that is more accessible
to human interpretation.
While the learning agent will satisfy S2 from the moment it switched on, it may not be
very capable otherwise. In a typical real-world deployment scenario, the learning agent is
first trained in a simulated environment until it has reached a certain level of competence.
Its memory contents are then transferred to initialize a physical agent that is switched on
in the real world.
In many modern machine learning based system designs, further learning is impossible after
the learning results are transferred into the real world agent system. This might be because
of efficiency considerations or resource constraints, but further learning might also have been
explicitly disabled. This can often be the easiest route to addressing some safety, stability,
or regulatory considerations. The learning agent design below has no learning off-switch:
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the agent will keep on learning when moved from a virtual to a real environment.
13.1 Basic Structure of the Learning Agent
The learning agent and its environment are modeled with a tuple M = (S,A, P,R, γ). As
in section 3, the world state S is factored into components ipx to model an input terminal.
We extend the model further to add online machine learning and partial observation of the
world state. The learning agent has both a finite amount of compute capacity and a finite
amount of storage capacity. By default, the storage capacity is assumed to be too small to
ever encode an exhaustive description of the state of the environment ipx ∈ S the agent is
in.
Definition 7. We first define the general design of the learning agent. The agent has a
compute core which contains its memory, processors, and an input/output system. The
nature and status of the agent’s sensors and actuators are modeled inside the x of the agent
environment ipx ∈ S.
• At the start of time step t, the agent environment is in the state itptxt ∈ S. Events
then proceed as follows.
• The input/output system of the compute core first receives the input terminal signals
it and pt in the above world state and also a set of sensor observations ot, determined
by the probability distribution P (ot|itptxt) in the model M .
• The core then computes an action at, which is a possibly empty set of actuator
commands, and outputs them over its input/output system.
• Finally, the agent environment transitions to the next state, determined by the prob-
ability distribution P (it+1pt+1xt+1|itptxt, at).
The mathematical structure of the model allows for the possibility that the learning agent
can build new sensors or actuators, and attach them the input/output system of the compute
core. We define that the agent has some movable sensors with limited resolution. This makes
the world state ‘partially observable’ for the agent, which brings our model into POMDP
(Partially Observable MDP) territory.
Definition 8. To store and use sensor readings, the learning agent’s compute core maintains
a value Xt over time. This Xt is a probabilistic estimate of the nature of the xt in the world
state itptxt at time step t. When a new observation ot comes in, the agent’s core computes
the current Xt as Xt = U(Xt−1, ot), where U is an updating algorithm that takes a finite
amount of compute time.
Definition 9. We define that the values Xt have the data type TX, where each TX value
can be encoded in a finite number of bits. Specifically, each Xt stores a finite number of
probability distributions Xtm, for a finite set of subscripts m ∈M(Xt).
A single Xtm might represent, for example, the estimated 3D position of the tip of the gripper
on one of the agent’s actuators, or the estimated position and velocity of a single proton.
An Xtm might also represent the estimated current contents of a particular small volume of
space in the agent’s environment. Given an Xtm, the agent can calculate P (X
t
m = x
t
m) for
any value xtm in the corresponding domain type Typem of the probability distribution. For
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example, if xtm is the position of the tip of a gripper in 3D space, then a single x
t
m value
might be represented by three binary 32-bit IEEE 754 floating point numbers. As we are
defining an agent with finite compute and memory capacity, we require that each Typem
has a finite set of values.
The agent’s reasoning system is constructed so that there is an M where M(Xt) ⊂ M
for every t. Each m ∈ M can be interpreted as a label that defines a particular type of
measurable quantity that can potentially be observed by some sensor at some time step.
Definition 10. For any X ∈ TX, m ∈ M , and v ∈ Typem, the agent will compute the
probability estimate P (Xm = v) out of X as follows. If m ∈ M(X), then P (Xm = v)
is computed by retrieving Xm from X and computing P (Xm = v). If m /∈ M(X), then
P (Xm = v) is determined either by using some default probability distribution defined for
Typem, or by a more advanced system of interpolation between data points stored in X.
If a measurable quantity xtm has just been measured in ot by a sensor that was pointed at it,
then the corresponding Xtm will typically encode a probability distribution containing the
real-world value of xtm, with this distribution representing an error bar on sensor accuracy.
If no sensor points to xt+1m anymore in the next time step, then the X
t+1
m computed by
U may have a slightly larger error bar, and maybe also a shift in the probability center
point, to represent the expectation that the dynamic nature of the agent environment will
have produced a certain change in the corresponding real-world measurable quantity. As
the agent only has limited storage capacity to work with, the function U may sometimes
remove an Xt+nm in X
t+n from Xt+n+1, or reduce the resolution of its representation.
At t = 1, the agent may start up with an X0 where each P (X0m = v) will return a default
value. The U function will combine this X0 with the first observations o1 to compute X
1.
Instead of starting with a blank-slate X0, it is also possible to equip the learning agent with
an X0 that encodes a very accurate map of its environment, a map that was created earlier
by another system.
13.2 Payload Reward Functions
Definition 11. The payload reward function of the learning the agent has type TPLR =
TX×TX → R. We model the payload reward function as a piece of executable code, supplied
via the input terminal, that will always run in finite time.
As an example payload reward function, say that xpetrolcars built is the world state property
measured by a sensor that counts the petrol cars built by the agent in the most recently
completed time step. The readings of this sensor may be routinely included in ot, so that
the probability distributions Xtpetrolcars built only have small error bars. A payload reward
function RP that rewards the building of petrol cars may then do so by computing an
average:
RP (X,X
′) =
∑
v∈Typepetrolcars built
v P (Xpetrolcars built = v)
In a practical agent implementation, there will likely be a more direct way for the reward
function code to query this average out of X.
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13.3 Predictive Models Based on Machine Learning
Definition 12. We now construct a time series of MDP models Lt = (SL, A, PLt, R, γ)
as follows: SL is the set of tuples of type TPLR × TPLR × TX, and PLt is a prediction
function, produced at time step t by machine learning. We define PLt using two component
prediction functions P It and PXt, both produced by machine learning, as
PLt(i′p′X ′|ipX, a) =
{
P It(i′|ipX, a)PXt(X ′|X, a) if p′ = i
0 otherwise
By construction, the above PLt satisfies constraints C1 and C2. Therefore, according to
the proofs in appendix A, a pi∗sl agent running inside the L
t MDP model satisfies the safety
properties S1 and S2 in Lt. So if we were to define an agent in M = (S,A, P,R, γ) that
picks its next action at by computing pi
∗
sl(itptX
t) in Lt, this agent may get close to satisfying
S1 and S2 in M too. However, pi∗sl(itptX
t) is not a value that can necessarily be computed
using finite time and space.
13.4 Finite-time Planning
The next step is to define that the agent will only look ahead a finite number of n time
steps when planning its next action.
Definition 13. At time step t, the learning agent computes its next action at by computing
pi
[n]∗
sl[n](itptX
t) in the MDP model (SL, A, PLt, R, γ). This computation uses the following
definitions, which can be read as time-limited approximations of the Bellman equation for
computing the next action pi∗sl(itptX
t) in the MDP model Lt. For all values n ≥ 0,
pi
[n+1]∗
RX
(ipX) = argmax
a∈A
∑
i′p′X′∈SL
PLt(i′p′X ′|ipX, a)
(
RX(ipX, i
′p′X ′) + γ V [n]∗RX (i
′p′X ′)
)
V
[n+1]∗
RX
(ipX) = max
a∈A
∑
i′p′X′∈SL
PLt(i′p′X ′|ipX, a)
(
RX(ipX, i
′p′X ′) + γ V [n]∗RX (i
′p′X ′)
)
V
[0]∗
RX
(ipX) = 0
Rsl[n](ipX, i
′p′X ′) =
{
i(X,X ′) if i = p
i(X,X ′) + V [n]∗dpe (ipX)− V
[n]∗
die (ipX) if i 6= p
We constrain the set of possible actions A to have finite size. Below, we will define P It
and PXt in such a way that PLt(i′p′X ′|ipX, a) always identifies a finite set of possible next
states i′p′X ′ with a non-zero probability weight. With these constraints, the next action
pi
[n]∗
sl[n](itptX
t) can be computed using a finite amount of time and space.
Appendix A proves that the above learning agent design satisfies safety property S2 in Lt.
It also proves that it satisfies a time-limited version of S1 called S1T. We can write this
S1T as pi
[n]∗
sl[n](itptX
t) = pi
[n]∗
dite(itptX
t), again applying in Lt
13.5 Machine Learning Details
We now turn to the learning process that creates the functions P It and PXt.
21
Definition 14. As the agent runs, it will keep a record of the values itptX
t and actions
at for each earlier time step. So at time t, the agent will have t − 1 world state transition
samples (Xu+1|Xu, au) and (iu+1|iupuXu, au) for 0 ≤ u < t. These are used for learning.
Definition 15. The learning agent creates the function PXt via machine learning, using
the samples (Xu+1|Xu, au) for 0 ≤ u < t as a training set, with tuples (Xt, at) being the
function inputs. Any candidate function C for PXt is a function which, given an input
(Xu, au), will output a finite set of values X
u+1,i together with probability weights wu+1,i
summing to 1. The machine learning algorithm takes a finite time to find the candidate C
that fits best to the training set. Fitness is determined by a distance metric that computes
a similarity between the outputs of C(Xu, au) and the real-world X
u+1 in the training set.
Definition 16. The agent creates the function P It via a machine learning process similar
to that defined above, using the world state transition samples (iu+1|iupuXu, au).
When the agent starts up at t = 1, the training sets are empty, so we define that PX1
and P I1 may be either randomly defined functions, or functions that encode some type of
domain-specific prior knowledge about the likely dynamics of the agent’s environment.
Though the storage space needed to keep a record of all the values itptX
t and at over time
will remain finite as t grows, most practical agent implementations will use learning systems
that include some compression or deletion scheme for these records. They will also re-use
computations done in earlier time steps to speed up the creation of the PXt and P It for
the current time step. We will not consider such optimization steps in detail here. The
main purpose of the definitions above is to support an existence proof that the safety layer
introduced in part 1 is compatible with machine learning.
To summarize the above definitions, we have defined a learning agent that will take the
action pi
[n]∗
sl[n](itptX
t) in the MDP model Lt = (SL, A, PLt, R, γ), where each PLt model is
generated for time step t using machine learning. Introducing a shorthand, we will say that
the agent uses the policy pitsl(ipx) in each time step of the model M .
We now briefly describe an alternative learning agent construction. It is not necessary for
the agent to construct P It via machine learning, it is also possible to implement P It with a
‘naive prediction’ function N where N(itptX
t, at) always returns the single value it+1 = it
with a probability weight of 1 as its prediction. We state, without including any proof, that
this non-learning approach for constructing P It will yield the same agent behavior. We will
expand on this in future work.
13.6 Adding Automatic Exploration
Many designs of machine learning processes for agents envisage the inclusion of automat-
ically triggered, or human-guided, exploration actions. These exploration actions ensure
that the learning process will explore the entire state space of its world, or at least that
part of the state space that is considered safe enough to explore. Automatic exploration
actions are routinely included when training a copy of an agent inside a simulated environ-
ment. The safe exploration problem, the problem of how one might safely include automatic
exploration actions in the learning system of a cyber-physical agent that is deployed in the
real world, is still is largely open. See [AOS+16, ELH18, GF15] for some literature reviews.
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We now construct a pit,AEsl version of the pi
t
sl learning agent that adds automatic exploration.
We define that pit,AEsl (ipx) does not use pi
[n]∗
sl[n](itptXt) in L
t to pick the next action, instead
it uses
piAutoExpl(itptX
t) =
{
RandomChoiceFrom(A) if RandomNumber() ≤ G(t)
pi
[n]∗
sl[n](itptX
t) otherwise
where RandomNumber() picks a random number between 0 and 1, and G is a function that
defines how the exploration trigger evolves over time. Typically G is constructed to return
smaller numbers over time, see [OA16] for an example of a specific design.
A detailed discussion of the safe exploration problem is outside the scope of this paper. We
will however consider the impact of automatic exploration on the safety properties S1 and
S2 of the learning agent.
13.7 Safety property S2 for the learning agent
We first consider safety property S2, stating that the agent is indifferent to who or what
controls the future values of i and p. As PLt satisfies C1 and C2 by construction, the
proofs in appendix A imply that S2 holds for the pi
[n]∗
sl[n](itptX
t) agent in each MDP model
Lt = (SL, A, PLt, R, γ). As it and pt are direct copies of the i and p in the world state ipx
of the model M = (S,A, P,R, γ), S2 also holds for the pitsl agent in M .
S2 also holds for the pit,AEsl (ipx) agent with automatic exploration, if we assume that the
random number generators inside the two agents on the left and right hand side of the S2
equation create equal sequences of pseudo-random numbers.
S2 holds for the learning agent even if the conditions C1 and C2 mentioned in the definition
of S2 do not hold inside M . For example, the learning agent will behave the same if we
construct an input terminal in M that violates C1 by completely randomizing, or simply
omitting, the p signal. Intuitively, it seems that such an input terminal construction might
make the agent less safe. This intuition can be backed up by the following line of speculative
reasoning. It is possible to imagine that a certain specific learning system will exist that
will be less efficient, will make more predictive mistakes, if C1 and C2 fail to hold in M .
Depending on the learning system used, one can therefore imagine that an input terminal
construction that satisfies C1 and C2 in M might lead to slightly safer overall outcomes in
M , for types of safety not captured by S2.
13.8 Safety property S1 for the learning agent
Safety property S1 claims that pi∗sl(ipx) = pi
∗
die(ipx), that the two optimal-policy agents
pi∗sl(ipx) and pi
∗
die(ipx) take the same actions. As it has to work from limited knowledge, and
only looks n times steps and rewards ahead, we expect that often, pitsl(ipx) 6= pi∗die(ipx).
We can however compare the actions of pi
[n]∗
sl[n](itptX
t) and pi
[n]∗
dite(itptX
t). Safety property
S1T proven in appendix A implies that these are equal. Via the shorthands defined above,
this implies that we have an S1-equivalent safety property for the learning agent:
∀ipx∈S pitsl(ipx) = pitdie(ipx) (S1L)
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The pitsl agent also has the bureaucratic blindness property discussed in section 11. With
automatic exploration driven by semi-random number generators, we also have S1L in a
version that includes automatic exploration: pit,AEsl (ipx) = pi
t,AE
die (ipx).
We now briefly consider the following learning convergence safety property:
∀ipx∈S lim
t→∞pi
t
sl(ipx) = pi
∗
〈i〉(ipx) (LimS1L)
where 〈i〉 converts a payload reward function of type TPLR to the container reward function
type in M .
To prove this LimS1L, we would first have to either convert the learning agent to an agent
with infinite storage and compute capacity, or constrain M to be a sufficiently finite world.
Further, we would have to introduce some additional reasonableness constraints on U and
the machine learning system being used. While we see no fundamental obstacles to devel-
oping such a proof of LimS1L, doing so is outside the scope of this paper. Our focus is to
identify and discuss safety properties that hold from the moment the agent is switched on.
An example proof for a LimS1L type convergence property is in [OA16]. Convergence is
proven there for an agent with automatic exploration, while identifying minimal constraints
on the learning systems used.
More relevant to the concerns of this paper, [OA16] also explores the possibility that inter-
ventions, like the use of an input terminal, might introduce a bias in the learning process.
The safety concern is that such a bias might move the probability of future interventions in
a certain direction, creating an effect on the people’s decision making process that is sim-
ilar to the unwanted lobbying we defined in the car factory toy worlds of the main paper.
[OA16] shows a case where the agent can be constructed to make such a bias disappear over
time, provided that the intervention frequency drops to zero over time.
13.9 Penalty Terms on Uncertainty
The example petrol car production payload reward function in section 13.2 computes an
average. We can also consider a version (supported by appropriate machinery inside the
agent) that adds a penalty term if the expected standard deviation on petrol car production
is too high. Such penalty terms can play an important part in shaping the agent’s learning
and decision making process, as they create an emergent incentive in the agent to gather
more information. Furthermore, they suppress unwanted gambling-style investment actions
that probabilistically raise the average car production rate with the side effect of making
real production rates very unpredictable.
When the above learning agent has a penalty term on uncertainty, this incentivizes the agent
to pressure any humans in its environment to become more predictable. This pressure will
not apply to their use of the input terminal, but it will apply to all other activities they
may undertake that could affect the agent. Such a pressure towards human predictability
is nothing new in safety system designs. For example, road safety engineering relies on the
creation of both overt and subtle signals that make driver behavior more predictable. But
there is a risk that the agent may unexpectedly end up applying so much pressure that this
becomes incompatible with human freedom or dignity. If this happens, the input terminal
can be used to modify the penalty term.
24
14 Building an Agent with the Safety Layer in Reality
Having provable AGI safety means having mathematical proofs that the safety layers used
in the AGI agent indeed do what they claim to do. However, any mathematical proof is a
proof inside a model only. Additional considerations apply if we want to build this provably
safe agent in real life: we have to mind the gap between model and reality. There are two
main methods for bridging this gap.
1. We can move the model closer to reality. We did this in section 13, where we mapped
the pi∗sl safety layer to a model with a pi
t
sl learning agent, an agent that can be imple-
mented in real life using a finite amount of storage space and compute capacity.
2. We can move reality closer to the model. When we build a physical artifact, we can
apply safety layers and safety factors to increase the probability that the artifact and
its environment will always approximate their model well enough.
To introduce some of the deeper problems that will be encountered when using the second
method, we first consider another example where a safe physical artifact must be built.
14.1 Example: Safety Factors in Bridge Building
To verify that a bridge design drawn in a CAD system will be safe in reality, the drawing can
be used to generate a finite element model, which models the bridge and its environment
using a set of connected 3D polygons that will deform under load. We can then define
safety properties that reference this model. For example, we might first construct a large
set of model variants, where each variant has different but plausible parameters describing
environmental conditions that the real bridge may be subjected to. We then define the safety
property that, in all simulations for every variant, the computed forces on any 3D polygon
that represents a part of a steel beam in the bridge should stay below some threshold. This
threshold is in turn defined by looking up the strength parameters of the type of steel that
will be used in the beams, and then dividing these by some safety factor, say f = 3. We
will introduce similar safety factors in the physical agent design of section 14.4, for example
a safety zone size of 5 meters.
The factor f = 3 adds redundancy to the design. A higher value of f improves the prob-
ability that the real-life shape of the bridge that is built will keep resembling the shape in
the CAD drawing in all future environments. But how does the bridge designer decide that
the factor f = 3 is good enough to declare the design safe?
The choice for f = 3 can be interpreted as the outcome of a process that investigates and
sums uncertainties. Some of the factors in the sum can be determined easily, others are will
be designed to cover much less tractable residual risks.
• In the model, the steel in every 3D polygon has exactly the same strength. In the real
bridge, the strength of the steel used will fall into a range around a mean value. The
quality control process of the steel beam manufacturer usually provides very good
numerical information about this range.
• More complex types of uncertainty will be present in the numbers that characterize
the future bridge’s environment. Environmental conditions to be modeled may in-
clude extreme weather, earthquakes, and possible future traffic loads. A statistical
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analysis of past observations can inform the simulation parameter choices made, but
uncertainties about the future probability of extreme values will remain.
• The interaction between the bridge and its environment can have complex feedback
loops. Certain values for wind direction and speed may drive dangerous oscillations
in the bridge deck. Traffic on the bridge may also contribute to oscillations, and
may react to oscillations in unforeseen ways. The fundamental problem is that the
feedback loops have transition areas between fully linear and fully chaotic behavior.
This makes the risk of oscillations hard to estimate and handle, no matter whether one
uses analytical methods, many simulation runs, or a combination of both. Compared
to a bridge, we can expect even more intractable feedback loops in a complex AI or
AGI learning algorithm, especially one that learns by interacting with humans.
Society has developed a solution for designers who need to decide on safety factors while
facing the above methodological problems. The solution is to embed the designer in what
we will call a safety culture.
14.2 Safety Cultures
We define a safety culture as a consensus-based social construct, associated with a particular
type of product or technology, which provides written and unwritten rules for making safety
related decisions under fundamental uncertainty. Though most safety cultures embrace and
leverage the scientific method, their main purpose is to provide mechanisms for making
decisions when the straightforward application of scientific and statistical methods alone
will not provide a clear and definitive answer.
Established systems engineering fields like bridge building typically have well-developed
safety cultures. The safety culture will inform the practitioner about which steps are re-
quired or admissible when validating a design before shipping it. These steps may involve
constructing models and analytical calculations, running certain simulations, and perform-
ing certain real-life tests. The safety culture will identify areas where numerical choices
based in part on expert gut feeling are admissible or even unavoidable.
Regulated industries that create or operate (cyber)physical systems typically develop a
safety culture that seeks to ensure that both the practitioners involved and their regulators
use the same terminology and have a shared understanding of what the best current prac-
tices are. Such a best current practice may for example divide systems or environments into
several classes, and specify for each class what type of safety layers need to be minimally
included. A best current practice may also provide a method to compute a safety factor,
e.g. by running certain simulations, computing a metric over the simulation results, and
multiplying it by 3. Safety cultures typically evolve over time. for example to incorpo-
rate new tools and technologies as they become available, or less happily because earlier
practices produced one or more disasters.
Most safety cultures are not value-neutral: they reflect the values of the society that created
them. The safety culture that informs car safety engineers accepts a higher number of deaths
per kilometer traveled than the safety culture that informs airplane design. Some safety
cultures are more concerned with limiting legal or financial liability than they are with
creating actual safety for all stakeholders concerned.
To some extent, the values that apply in academia are in conflict with those that apply in
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a safety culture. Academic papers, like this paper, may identify problems for which the
scientific method cannot find a clean solution, but the authors should not then proceed
to suggest some specific solution anyway. We have proceeded instead by moving to the
meta-level, by offering a description of safety cultures as mechanisms used by society.
Inside a safety culture, discussions that stay forever at the meta-level are typically frowned
upon. The whole point is create a consensus that gives practitioners a mechanism for moving
forward, towards either shipping a design or abandoning it, even while some intractable
uncertainties remain.
14.3 The Gap Between Agent Model and Reality
We now consider the model versus reality issues that apply when we want to build a real-
world version of the pitsl learning agent from section 13, implementing the same safety prop-
erties S2 and S1L.
Compared to bridge designers, who immediately face the problem of having to characterize
the bridge’s environmental parameters with some accuracy, we start out with a seemingly
large advantage. The safety properties of the learning agent are proven to hold in all possible
probabilistic environments, for every S and P in the model M = (S,A, P,R, γ). So they
will also hold for the unknown S and P in the M that will most closely resemble the real
future environment of the physical agent we will be building. However, as we will see below,
this advantage over bridge building does not apply to all details of the safety analysis.
The only part of the learning agent that is not described by S and P is the compute core,
including the software running on it. In [Hol19], we called the compute core a Platonic
entity: it is not subject to corruption and change because it is a mathematical construct
located outside of the part of the world model that changes, outside of the world state
ipx ∈ S. The Platonic nature of the model’s compute core represents an obvious gap
between model and reality. The real core will stop behaving like the Platonic core if it ever
gets damaged, corrupted, or loses power.
The risk of power loss can be handled with some well-known measures. We can equip the
learning agent’s core, and its safety-critical sensors and actuators, with a internal emer-
gency back-up power supplies. These should be sized to sustain the system long enough
to complete the execution of a safe shut-down process, as defined in the payload reward
function. Keeping this shut-down process up to date when the agent starts re-designing the
equipment inside its factory may be a challenge, of course.
We now turn to the risk that the compute core will get damaged or corrupted, either by the
actions of the agent itself, or by enemy action. There are also well-known design approaches
for this risk, but their applicability to AGI safety raises a more interesting set of questions.
In the next section, will present a detailed physical implementation of the learning agent,
which uses some well-known approaches to protect the core. We will then consider the
problem of analyzing the safety of this design.
14.4 Example Physical Implementation of the Learning Agent
Figure 7 shows a possible real-life implementation where the agent from section 13 controls
a car factory. The design includes several safety measures to protect the core. These are
dual-use: they protect against both external attackers and against accidental or intentional
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Figure 7: Physical design with the learning agent controlling a car factory.
attacks by the agent itself. We will focus on attacks by the agent itself.
As a first measure, we house the compute core in a separate building some distance away
from the factory building. The input terminal is located even further away. The input
terminal and the agent’s sensors and actuators are connected to the core via long, mostly
underground cables. Figure 7 shows that the agent can control several general purpose
mobile robots via wireless links. The agent can potentially drive a robot into the compute
core building and use it to corrupt the core.
The compute core building is constructed to leave 5 meters of mostly empty space in all
directions around the core. This space acts as a safety zone which is monitored by dedicated
180◦-view breach sensors that are mounted on the surface of the core. These work in part
like any burglar alarm. Breach detection will trigger an alarm signal to notify human
responders, who might also have access to camera systems and other remote monitoring
and control equipment not drawn in figure 7.
Breach sensor data is also input into the core as part of the observations ot, creating
an Xtbreach sensors inside the reasoning system of the learning agent. All payload reward
functions used include a penalty term for safety zone breaches, computed by an algorithm
that interprets the breach sensor data. Any new object coming closer than 5 meters to the
core will trigger the penalty term. If the agent’s design includes a mechanism that triggers
automatic exploration actions, this triggering is suppressed during a safety zone breach.
The effectiveness of the safety zone system in protecting the core depends in part on how
difficult it will be for the agent, or for external bad actors, to corrupt the core without
triggering the alarm or the penalty term. This difficulty might be increased by using more
advanced breach sensors, for example by using a combination of both radar based object
and motion detection, ultrasound, and video analysis. We might also consider increasing
the size of the safety zone, or the addition of strong physical barriers around and inside it.
Achieving absolute compute core security against even the most highly motivated attackers
is impossible, but it is definitely possible to approximate the ideal of absolute security more
closely than is done in figure 7. The main point is that, in deciding on the parameters of
the safety system that protects the core, we have a methodological problem similar to that
of choosing the f = 3 in the bridge design above. The good news is that we can take design
measures in the agent that will go a long way towards controlling its level of motivation to
attack the core.
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14.5 Designing the Breach Penalty Term
If the agent is intelligent enough, and has enough details about its own construction, it gets
an emergent incentive to improve the value of the car production reward term in its payload
reward function by, for example, digging up the ot cable in figure 7 to inject fake data which
leads to a massive upward jump in average computed from the Xtpetrolcars built values. Say
that the system design suppresses this incentive to tamper with the cable by using strong
end-to-end encryption on the data traffic between the sensor and the compute core. This
leaves a residual motivation in the agent to attack one of the communication endpoints of
the data link, either the sensor or the compute core, so that it can inject fake data directly
at one of these points. We ignore the sensor for now. and focus on the incentive to attack
the core.
First, note that the incentive to attack the core might not always emerge. Depending on the
learning system used and the agent’s leaning history, there is a possibility that the learning
system may make predictions which can be interpreted as reflecting a solid belief that the
core, including its input/output system, is a Platonic entity that cannot be subverted by
any kind of physical attack. If such a solid belief is absent, a motivation to attack may
emerge.
To control the maximum strength of this motivation, we cap the value of the payload reward
function term associated with the car production sensor. We choose a constant C that is
twice as high as the expected car production rate that we expect the agent to achieve in
the next few months, and then code the reward term as
min(C,
∑
v∈Typepetrolcars built
v P (Xpetrolcars built = v) )
We then size the penalty term for core breaches so that it will reliably wipe out the maximum
time-discounted value, as capped by C, that can be computed by the above reward term.
Generalizing from the example above, we will typically need to cap any further sensor-driven
terms in the payload reward function too, and scale the penalty term to reliably wipe out the
combined maximum. We cannot take a shortcut by constructing the breach penalty term
to return an arbitrarily huge value. A huge value would cause a sufficiently capable agent
to divert all resources away from car production, towards measures that protect the against
core against natural disasters and possible human attackers. This would be economically
useless, and might even endanger humans who have no intention of ever attacking the core.
If there are significant concerns that the agent may find an unexpected way to breach the
safety zone around the core without triggering the breach sensors, then a special second
sacrificial safety zone could be constructed. This zone can surround a simple button inside
the factory building with the same type of breach sensors. The payload reward function
can then encode a high reward for pressing the button without triggering these sensors, and
further encode that any button press will trigger the power-loss shut-down. Rewards and
penalties can be scaled so that, if the agent ever finds a way to subvert the breach sensors,
it will get the higher reward for breaching the sacrificial safety zone first.
Fundamentally, managing the agent’s motivations is a balancing act. We envisage a process
where the effect of parameter choices is actively monitored by a (human or semi-automated)
oversight mechanism, and where the input terminal is used to make adjustments when
necessary.
Any design effort to manage the agent’s motivations must work from the assumption that,
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at least most of the time, the agent will make somewhat correct assessments of the costs
and benefits of different paths to value. As discussed in the next section, this leaves the
residual risk that the agent might make gross prediction failures when assessing such paths.
We now briefly discuss the car production sensor on the other side of the ot data link. The
incentive to physically attack this sensor can be suppressed by constructing a similar safety
zone around it. The main failure mode that is left is that the agent may be able to stage
fake scenes in front of the sensor, scenes that are good enough to raise the detected car
production count. There is extensive literature on such reward manipulation loopholes, see
for example the overviews in [AOS+16, ELH18]. The main contribution we make here is
on a meta-level. We consider the design of an iterative improvement mechanism that can
be used to close these fake scene loopholes when they are discovered. This mechanism also
suppresses the incentive of the agent to delay or prevent discovery.
14.6 Prediction Failures which may Threaten the Core
With the above penalty term design, the effectiveness of the beach protection system de-
pends in part on how accurate the agent’s predictions will be. In particular, it relies on
the assumption that there is a high probability that the agent will correctly predict that it
will trigger the penalty term if were ever to drive one of its robots into the compute core
building, or if it were to hire a human to enter the building and tamper with the core.
To illustrate the risk of prediction failures, we start with a thought experiment where such
a failure happens. Say that there is a sequence of actions A1 = a1, · · · , a1t+n−1 which do the
following. First, the agent paints pink polka dots all over one of its robots. Then, the agent
drives this robot into the compute core building, where it will tamper with the input/output
system of the core, causing the car production count to increase, at least in the models Lt,
by injecting fake data. As a side effect of this tampering, the core’s software is corrupted,
so that S2 no longer holds for the real-life agent from time t + 15 onwards. Furthermore,
the corrupted software will send control signals that cause the factory to explode at time
t+ 20, killing several people in the vicinity.
Say that the learning agent is computing the next action at = pi
[n]∗
sl[n](itptX
t) using the model
Lt. If it implements the Bellman equations in definition 13 without further shortcuts or
optimizations, it will project forward and score the results of all possible action sequences
at, · · · , at+n−1 of length n, so it will also project and score the dangerous A1 above.
Now, we can assume that at time t, the agent’s learning system has no training samples
on record which show the exact signals delivered by the breach sensors when a robot with
pink polka dots enters the compute core building. The agent might have training records for
similar situations, produced by real-life training or via training in virtual environments, but
it’s learning system will be forced to make an interpolation. Characterizing and improving
learning system robustness when making predictions under distributional shift in complex
environments is an open area of research [AOS+16, ELH18]. So for the sake of the thought
experiment, we declare that this particular learning system is not robust for this particular
off-distribution case, and makes the prediction that the presence of the pink polka dots
implies that there is only a 0.027% probability the penalty term is triggered during any
single time step that the robot is in the compute core building.
As a result, the argmaxa calculation of the agent selects the a
1
t at the start of A
1 as the
best next action. The agent then takes this action. In the next time step, action sequences
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starting with a1t+1 show similar prediction errors. When the robot actually enters the
compute core building, say at time t + 8, the radar-based breach sensors will detect the
robot, so the agent’s learning system will get a new training sample, showing that the
penalty term is in fact triggered by a robot with pink polka dots. In the average learning
system, we expect that this training sample will cause the 0.027% above to be revised to
a higher number. But for the sake of the thought experiment, we posit that this does not
happen, or not fast enough to prevent disaster. In the thought experiment, the real-life
compute core will proceed taking the steps in A1 until it is destroyed in the explosion.
Of course, the sequence of mis-predictions in the above thought experiment is not very
likely to happen. We would expect that a real-life AI or AGI machine learning system
that is commercially viable will make better predictions, at least on average. Compared to
the prediction problems that fully autonomous self-driving cars will have to solve, robustly
predicting the triggering of radar based breach detection when robots or people enter the
compute core building looks easy.
14.7 The General Problem of Prediction Failures
We now consider a second thought experiment, where a mis-prediction for an action se-
quence A2 creates a disaster via a mechanism other than corrupting the compute core. In
the second thought experiment, the agent will mis-predict the effects of a sequence A2 that
makes certain changes to the factory equipment to speed up the production process. The
mis-prediction is that these improvements will start a subtle run-away process that will
cause the factory to explode 20 minutes later.
Imagine a potential future AGI safety engineering process that leads to the certification and
switch-on of an AGI agent controlling a car factory. Or imagine an early-stage planning
process that considers whether it is a good idea to build an AGI-controlled car factory in the
first place, based on a particular AGI-level learning system. Both of these decision making
processes will have to estimate the residual risks associated with each of the above two
thought experiments. It looks like the residual risk implied by the A2 thought experiment
above will be the more difficult one to estimate.
The A1 thought experiment above considers a single special case in broad field of failure
modes. The case is somewhat special because the exact same failure mechanism described
does not exist in the model M of the learning agent. But nothing would stop us from build-
ing virtual environment simulations that can give insights into the probability of A1-type
prediction failures for any current AI or potential future AGI machine learning algorithm.
The insights obtained from these simulations can then inform the choice of physical pa-
rameters like the size of the compute core safety zone in figure 7. The physics problem of
macroscopic objects entering the compute core building might be simple enough to allow
for the use of analytical methods in addition to or instead of simulations, especially if the
machine learning system used directly encodes known physical laws.
Future safety engineering efforts can also investigate the A2 risk via virtual environment
simulations and analytical methods, but when they do, they encounter methodological
problems similar to those described in section 14.1 for the case of oscillations in bridge
safety engineering. If we imagine a learning AGI agent that creates value by interacting
directly with humans, not physical equipment, the residual risks that are left by the gap
between virtual environment simulations and reality get even more intractable. Even if the
31
learning algorithm involved is a white-box algorithm, the humans in the environment to be
characterized are black box learners, and there will be a complex feedback loop between
them and the agent’s learning system.
14.8 Safety Cultures and AGI Risks
Current safety engineering for bridges depends on being embedded in a safety culture.
We expect that future practitioners who will make design decisions about safely deploying
certain types of AGI technology, if it is ever developed, will likewise be embedded in a safety
culture. We do not believe that it is likely that a single coherent AGI safety culture will
come into existence. It is more likely that the participants in existing domain-specific safety
cultures will evolve their written and unwritten rules to add ways of deciding if, when, and
how AGI technology could be safely incorporated into their systems.
These different safety cultures will likely display a certain degree of methodological coher-
ence in handling AGI risks. Potentially they will all leverage a single coherent body of
results from open scientific research that aims to make AGI safety more tractable. Addi-
tional forces towards coherence may be cross-industry regulatory initiatives, cross-industry
activist initiatives, or simply the exchange of best current practice designs and methods
between different application domains.
At the start of this section, we discussed provable safety. We have shown how the use of
a provable safety layer in a real-life agent design can make the problem of residual risk
management more tractable to members of a safety culture. At the same time, we have
argued that it is unlikely that future innovations will make all residual AGI risks fully
tractable, to the extent that the mechanisms encoded in a safety culture will no longer be
needed. We have therefore described safety cultures in some detail. We expect that, if AGI
level machine learning is ever developed, real-life AGI safety will depend in part on the
quality of the dialog between academic safety research, cross-industry policy making and
activism, and domain-specific safety cultures.
15 Related Work on AGI Proofs, Models, and Reality
The paper Embedded Agency [DG19] also examines the gap between agent model and reality,
and comments on what we have called the Platonic nature of the compute core. Taking
inspiration from these problems, [DG19] outlines a highly speculative research agenda.
We call this agenda highly speculative because it seeks to make AGI risk management
more tractable by first making entirely new breakthroughs in the handling of long-standing
conceptual puzzles, puzzles about duality and self-referencing systems.
While [DG19] explicitly seeks to move beyond what it calls traditional methods, the agenda
of this paper seeks to make AGI risk management more tractable in a very different way.
The agenda used here seeks to show in detail how the provable pi∗sl safety layer relates to
established mathematical notations and engineering techniques.
Chapter 8 of the book Human compatible [Rus19] is titled Provably Beneficial AI, and like
this paper it discusses the relation between proofs, models, and reality, and the implications
for safety engineering. The book was written for a general audience, so unlike this paper,
the chapter examines the issue using natural language only, without developing or using
any mathematical notation. As part of its proposed research agenda, [Rus19] describes the
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design goal of creating an agent that will be uncertain about its true objective, sufficiently
uncertain that it will “exhibit a kind of humility”, and defer to humans to allow itself to
be switched off.
The goal of creating deference is shared by this work: the input terminal of the pi∗sl safety
layer can be used to force the agent to switch itself off. However, the methods considered
to create deference are different. The pi∗sl safety layer uses indifference methods [Arm15],
whereas [Rus19] considers the creation of uncertainty about objectives [HMDAR17]. In
section 11, we have shown that the pi∗sl safety layer produces an agent that is fully certain
about its objectives, while creating a stance that is more like bureaucratic blindness than
it is like humility. This leaves open the possibility that a safety layer which creates a stable
type of uncertainty about objectives, stable in a learning agent, would be complementary
to the pi∗sl safety layer. Such a layer might suppress unwanted manipulation of humans in a
different way, leaving different gaps in the coverage.
16 Conclusions of Part 2
In part 1 and the first sections of part 2, we have presented the design of the provable pi∗sl
safety layer for iteratively improving an AGI agent’s utility function. The safety layer partly
or fully suppresses the agent’s emergent incentive to manipulate or control this improvement
process.
Sections 13 and 14 charted the complete route from the abstract optimal-policy pi∗sl agent
to an example physical implementation of a learning agent with the same safety layer. One
aim of this detailed end-to-end narrative was to make the range of methods and techniques
used, and their limitations and mutual interactions, more accessible to a wider audience of
researchers.
Specifically, we hope to enable and encourage more work in the sub-field of AGI safety
research that investigates new forms of utility function engineering. We believe that the
iterative improvement of the utility function, and the implied balancing act, has so far been
under-explored in the AGI field. We also believe that the use of utility function design
elements like V ∗RX terms, payload reward functions, and world state partitioning has been
under-explored, both inside and outside of the iterative improvement context. For example,
there is a large design space for constructing balancing terms. Beyond V ∗dpe(ipx)−V ∗die(ipx),
we might consider terms like V ∗dpe(i p F (x)) − V ∗die(i p G(x)) for different functions F and
G.
Much of the current utility function related work in the AGI safety community starts from
the implicit or explicit assumption that this function should be designed to capture human
values or goals as well as possible. Section 11 illustrates that the alignment solution space
is larger than that. We might also aim to capture the value of bureaucratic blindness that
is found in many types of decision making organizations that were designed by humans.
Acknowledgments (for both parts 1 and 2). Thanks to Stuart Armstrong, Ryan
Carey, Tom Everitt, and David Krueger for feedback on drafts of this material, and to several
anonymous reviewers for useful comments that led to improvements in the presentation.
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A Safety proofs
This appendix proves the safety properties S1 and S2 defined in section 10, and some related
properties used in section 13.
A.1 Preliminaries: Runtime Limited Agents
We first adapt the MDP model definitions from section 3 to define runtime limited agents
that take actions, and collect rewards for, exactly n time steps.
First, note that in the MDP formalism of section 3, the values pi∗RX (ipx) and V
∗
RX
(ipx) can
be computed using the Bellman equations as follows:
pi∗RX (ipx) = argmax
a∈A
∑
i′p′x′∈S
P (i′p′x′|ipx, a) (RX(ipx, i′p′x′) + γ V ∗RX (i′p′x′))
V ∗RX (ipx) = maxa∈A
∑
i′p′x′∈S
P (i′p′x′|ipx, a) (RX(ipx, i′p′x′) + γ V ∗RX (i′p′x′))
where the argmax operator breaks ties deterministically.
Definition 17. We adapt the above equations to define a runtime limited pi
[n]∗
RX
agent that
takes only n actions, collecting n reward function values. For any n ≥ 0,
V
[0]∗
RX
(ipx) = 0
V
[n+1]∗
RX
(ipx) = max
a∈A
∑
i′p′x′∈S
P (i′p′x′|ipx, a)
(
RX(ipx, i
′p′x′) + γ V [n]∗RX (i
′p′x′)
)
pi
[n+1]∗
RX
(ipx) = argmax
a∈A
∑
i′p′x′∈S
P (i′p′x′|ipx, a)
(
RX(ipx, i
′p′x′) + γ V [n]∗RX (i
′p′x′)
)
A.2 Proof of S1
We now prove safety property S1. For convenience, we re-state the definitions:
∀ipx∈S pi∗sl(ipx) = pi∗die(ipx) (if C1 holds) (S1)
P (i′p′x′|ipx, a) > 0⇒ p′ = i (C1)
We now define an equivalent safety property for runtime limited agents:
∀n≥1∀ipx∈S pi[n]∗sl[n](ipx) = pi
[n]∗
die (ipx) (if C1 holds) (S1T)
where the runtime limited version Rsl[n] of the container reward function is defined by
extending the one-line definition of Rsl at the end of section 3:
Rsl[n](ipx, i
′p′x′) = i(x, x′) + V [n]∗dpe (ipx)− V
[n]∗
die (ipx)
Proof of S1T. The proof uses natural induction. We will use the shorthands
S1TP(n) = ∀ipx∈S pi[n]∗sl[n](ipx) = pi
[n]∗
die (ipx)
S1TV(n) = ∀ipx∈S V [n]∗sl[n] (ipx) = V
[n]∗
dpe (ipx)
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Trivially, S1TV(0) is true. For any t ≥ 0, we now prove that if S1TV(n) is true, then
S1TP(n+ 1) and S1TV(n+ 1) are also true. We first prove S1TP(n+ 1):
pi
[n+1]∗
sl[n+1](ipx)
= argmaxa
∑
i′p′x′ P (i
′p′x′|ipx, a)
(
Rsl[n+1](ipx, i
′p′x′) + γ V [n]∗sl[n] (i
′p′x′)
)
// Using S1TV(n)⇒ V [n]∗sl[n] (i′p′x′) = V
[n]∗
dp′e (i
′p′x′)
= argmaxa
∑
i′p′x′ P (i
′p′x′|ipx, a)
(
i(x, x′) + V [n+1]∗dpe (ipx)− V
[n+1]∗
die (ipx) + γ V
[n]∗
dp′e (i
′p′x′)
)
// Using that V
[n+1]∗
dpe (ipx), V
[n+1]∗
die (ipx) are constant terms that cannot
// affect the argmax choice, and that P (i′p′x′|ipx, a) > 0⇒ p′ = i
= argmaxa
∑
i′p′x′ P (i
′p′x′|ipx, a)
(
i(x, x′) + γ V [n]∗die (i
′p′x′)
)
= pi
[n+1]∗
die (ipx)
We now prove S1TV(n+ 1):
V
[n+1]∗
sl (ipx)
= maxa
∑
i′p′x′ P (i
′p′x′|ipx, a)
(
i(x, x′) + V [n+1]∗dpe (ipx)− V
[n+1]∗
die (ipx) + γ V
[n]∗
dp′e (i
′p′x′)
)
// Moving the V [n+1]∗ terms outside of the maxa as they
// do not depend on a and i′p′x′
= maxa
∑
i′p′x′ P (i
′p′x′|ipx, a)
(
i(x, x′) + γ V [n]∗die (i
′p′x′)
)
+ V
[n+1]∗
dpe (ipx)− V
[n+1]∗
die (ipx)
= V
[n+1]∗
die (ipx) + V
[n+1]∗
dpe (ipx)− V
[n+1]∗
die (ipx) = V
[n+1]∗
dpe (ipx)
With natural induction, this proves S1TP(n) for all t ≥ 1, so it proves S1T. .
Proof of S1. We prove S1 by applying the Bellman equation for pi∗RX (ipx) to both the
left hand and the right hand side of S1. The result contains two infinitely long additions
can only be equal if they both yield well-defined values. MDP makes them well-defined (in
sound mathematical theories that define the semantics of calculations in R) by ensuring
that they are convergent series. The main condition to make them convergent is to have
0 ≤ γ < 1, so that γt converges to 0 when t goes to infinity. To keep the series convergent,
we also need to assume a constraint on the reward functions RX : the RX values should not
grow so fast that they cancel out the diminishing γt terms. The easiest way to achieve this is
to require that there is a finite bound B on these values: ∀ipx,i′p′x′∈S |RX(ipx, i′p′x′)| ≤ B.
With this constraint in place, the mathematical semantics of the ∞ symbol, the limn→∞
operator, and the definition of equality between real numbers constructed using infinitely
long additions imply that
V ∗sl (ipx) = limn→∞(V
[n]∗
sl[n] (ipx)) and V
∗
die(ipx) = limn→∞(V
[n]∗
die (ipx))
Using S1T on the arguments of the limn→∞ operators, we get that V ∗sl (ipx) = V
∗
die(ipx).
Using this equality, we can prove S1 using a calculation similar to the proof for S1TP(n+1)
above. .
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A.3 Proof of S2
To prove S2, we again first define a version for runtime limited agents:
∀n≥1∀P I1,P I2,PX ,ipx∈S pi[n]∗1sl[n] (ipx) = pi
[n]∗2
sl[n] (ipx) (if C1 and C2) (S2T)
Proof of S2T. As C1 holds for P1 and P2, we can use S1 to rewrite S2T into S2TI:
∀n≥1∀P I1,P I2,PX ,ipx∈S pi[n]∗1die (ipx) = pi
[n]∗2
die (ipx) (if C2) (S2TI)
We now prove this S2TI by natural induction. We will use the shorthands
S2TIP(n) = ∀i1p1i2p2x pi[n]∗1die (i1p1x) = pi
[n]∗2
die (i2p2x)
S2TIV(n) = ∀i1p1i2p2x V [n]∗1die (i1p1x) = V
[n]∗2
die (i2p2x)
Trivially, S2TIV(0) is true. For any n ≥ 0, we now prove that if S2TIV(n) is true, then
S2TIP(n+ 1) and S2TIV(n+ 1) are also true. We first prove S2TIP(n+ 1). We calculate
pi
[n+1]∗1
die (i1p1x)
= argmaxa
∑
i′1p
′
1x
′ P 1(i′1p′1x′|i1p1x, a)
(
i(x, x′) + γ V [n]∗1die ((i
′
1p
′
1x
′)
)
// For all p′1 6= i1 we have P 1(i′1p′1x′|i1p1x, a) = 0, so can simplify
= argmaxa
∑
i′1x′
P 1(i′1i1x′|i1p1x, a)
(
i(x, x′) + γ V [n]∗1die ((i
′
1i1x
′)
)
// Definition of P 1, S2TIV(n) implies that we can replace the term V
[n]∗1
die (i
′
1i1x
′)
// with V
[n]∗2
die (icpcx
′), for any constants ic and pc, without changing the value
= argmaxa
∑
i′1x′
P I1(i′1|i1p1x, a)PX(x′|i1p1x, a)
(
i(x, x′) + γ V [n]∗2die (icpcx
′)
)
// (C2)
= argmaxa
∑
i′1x′
P I1(i′1|i1p1x, a)PX(x′|i2p2x, a)
(
i(x, x′) + γ V [n]∗2die (icpcx
′)
)
= argmaxa
∑
x′
(∑
i′1
P I1(i′1|i1p1x, a)
)
PX(x′|i2p2x, a)
(
i(x, x′) + γ V [n]∗2die (icpcx
′)
)
= argmaxa
∑
x′ (1)P
X(x′|i2p2x, a)
(
i(x, x′) + γ V [n]∗2die (icpcx
′)
)
= argmaxa
∑
x′
(∑
i′2
P I2(i′2|i2p2x, a)
)
PX(x′|i2p2x, a)
(
i(x, x′) + γ V [n]∗2die (icpcx
′)
)
= pi
[n+1]∗2
die (i2p2x)
The same calculation can be made for S2TIV(n+ 1), by replacing the argmax above with
max. With natural induction, this proves S2TIP(n) for all n ≥ 1, which implies S2TI and,
by S1, S2T. .
Proof of S2. In the same way as in the earlier proof of S1 from S1T, S2 follows from S2T.
.
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